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KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR 2010-14353 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE 
TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Based upon the evidence presented by the State, the jury could conclude that 
Jesse Elias entered uninvited into the home of a female acquaintance, went up into her 
bedroom and, while she was asleep, penetrated her vagina with his finger. He was 
charged with violating Idaho Code § 18-6608 by committing the crime of penetration by 
a foreign object1 under alternative legal theories: 1) that he acted against the victim's 
1 The crime's official title is "Forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object." 
I.C. § 18-6608. 
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will by the use of force; or 2) where the alleged victim was unable to give consent due to 
temporary unsoundness of mind.2 A jury found Mr. Elias guilty (although the jurors were 
not asked to determine under which theory he committed the crime). Mr. Elias asserts 
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he violated I.C. § 18-6608 under 
either of these theories. He further asserts that his actions are not prohibited by I.C. 
§ 18-6608 because the legislature has omitted penetration occurring while the alleged 
victim sleeps as a means by which the crime can be committed. Mr. Elias asserts that 
this Court should find that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence upon which a 
jury could conclude that Mr. Elias committed the crime of penetration by a foreign object 
and should vacate his conviction. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Jesse Elias had committed the 
crimes of penetration by a foreign object and burglary. (R., pp.13-14.) Mr. Elias waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing, was bound over into the district court, and eventually 
an Amended Information was filed charging him with the above crimes. (R., pp.25-29, 
42-43.) The State alleged that Mr. Elias committed penetration by a foreign object 
"against that person's will by use of force or where that person was unable to give 
consent due to temporary unsoundness of mind, to wit: by inserting his finger(s) inside 
the vaginal opening of Shantell Steciuk, while she was sleeping and against her will ... ". 
Mr. Elias pied not guilty and his case proceeded to a jury trial. (R., pp.30-32, 59-64.) 
Ms. Steciuk testified that she was an acquaintance of Mr. Elias, meeting him 
through his sister who often visited her boyfriend living next door to Ms. Steciuk. (Tr. 
2 Mr. Elias was also charged with and convicted of burglary - a conviction he does not 
challenge in this appeal. 
2 
Trial, p.31, L 1 - p.38, L.1.) Although he had been a guest inside her triplex apartment 
in the past, Mr. Elias did not have permission to enter Ms. Steciuk's residence without 
asking her first. (Tr. Trial, p.38, L.18 p.39, L.9.) After locking her doors, Ms. Steciuk 
went to bed at about 10:30 on the night of July 19, 2010, with her two small children 
lying next to her. (Tr. Trial, p.31, Ls.16-21, p.39, L.10 - p.40, L.22.) When asked what 
she remembered next, Ms. Steciuk testified, "I woke up with Jesse sitting on the end of 
my bed, and he had his fingers inside my vagina." (Tr. Trial, p.40, Ls.20-24.) She then 
rolled onto her right side and felt Mr. Elias touch her a second time on "like my butt right 
before, you know, before my vagina" but "[i]t didn't go in." (Tr. Trial, p.41, L.23 - p.42, 
Ms. Steciuk testified that she then wrapped herself in a blanket and Mr. Elias 
was denied in his attempt to touch her a third time. (Tr. Trial, p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.22.)3 
The jury found Mr. Elias guilty of both penetration by a foreign object and 
burglary. (R., p.91.) The district court sentenced Mr. Elias to a total unified term of fifty 
years, with ten years fixed, for the penetration by a foreign object conviction, and a 
concurrent term of ten years fixed for the burglary conviction, with the court retaining 
jurisdiction. (R., pp.101-104; Tr., 1/31/11, p.14, Ls.6-20.) Mr. Elias successfully 
completed his rider and the district court placed him on probation for a period of 
fourteen years. (R., pp.113-117; Tr., 7/20/11, p.27, Ls.8-12.) Mr. Elias filed a Notice of 
3 The jury heard additional testimony from Officer Kevin Schmeckpeper, the 
investigating officer, Dr. Henry Amon, Jr., a doctor who examined Ms. Steciuk finding "a 
relatively minor abrasion on the right side, on the inside of [Ms. Steciuk's] labium and 
her inner lips," Shirley Bechtel, Mr. Elias' sister, and Mr. Elias himself who testified that 
he did enter Ms. Steciuk's apartment, although he denied any criminal intent when 
doing so, and who also denied penetrating Ms. Steciuk's vagina. (Tr. Trial, p.68, L.15 -
p.86, L.17, p.95, L.20-p.106, L.14, p.111, L.15-p.132, L.18, p.134, L.7-p.182, L.19.) 
3 
Appeal timely from the district court's Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of 
RighttoAppeal.4 (R., pp.113-117, 121-124.) 
Applying relevant principles of statutory interpretation and this Court's recent 
holding in State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412 (2013), the Court of Appeals held that I.C. 
§ 18-6608 does not prohibit penetration by a foreign object where the victim is merely 
asleep, and the Court further held that the "extrinsic force" standard applies where the 
State alleges the penetration was against the will of the victim by the use of force. State 
v. Elias, 2013 Opinion No. 43 (July 12, 2013) (hereinafter Opinion). The Court of 
Appeals ultimately concluded that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction under either the theory that Mr. Elias used force against the alleged 
victim's will, or the theory that the victim was of unsound mind merely because she was 
asleep. Id. This Court has granted the State's Petition for Review. 
4 Although Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) has since been amended, at the time the district 
court filed the Sentencing Disposition and Notice of Right to Appeal in January of 2011, 
the time to file a Notice of Appeal enabling a challenge to all aspects of the conviction 
and sentence was enlarged by the time the district court retained jurisdiction. See 
I.AR. 14(a) (2010). Therefore, Mr. Elias' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is 
ripe for review in this appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Should this Court vacate Mr. Elias' conviction for unlawful penetration by a foreign 
object because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Elias' Conviction For Unlawful Penetration By A Foreign 
Object Because There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction 
A Introduction 
The Idaho legislature has described three means by which the crime of 
penetration by a foreign object can be committed under Idaho Code § 18-6608: 
1) against the victim's will by the use of force, violence or duress, or the threat of force; 
2) where the victim is incapable of giving lawful consent due to unsoundness of mind; 
and 3) where the victim is prevented from resisting due to an intoxicating, narcotic or 
anesthetic substance. LC. § 18-6608. Unlike similar crimes which are committed at the 
point of penetration such as rape and male rape, the legislature has omitted from I.C. 
§ 18-6608 any language describing the commission of unlawful penetration by a foreign 
object occurring due to the victim merely being asleep. Compare I.C. § 18-6608 with 
LC.§ 18-6101(6)(a) and with I.C. § 18-6108(7). Because the evidence presented and 
believed by the jury demonstrated that the act of digital penetration occurred while 
Ms. Steciuk was asleep, was not accomplished by the use of force or threat of force, 
and Ms. Steciuk did not suffer from any unsoundness of mind, the State presented 
insufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction for penetration by a foreign object, 
requiring this Court to vacate that conviction. 
B. A Conviction Founded Upon Insufficient Evidence Violates A Defendant's Right 
To Due Process Of Law And Must Be Vacated 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State 
of Idaho from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law." U.S. Const. Amd. XIV. "Just as 'Conviction upon a charge not made would be 
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denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a 
man without evidence of his guilt." Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206 
(1960) (quoting De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) (additional 
citations omitted).) "It is axiomatic that a conviction upon a charge not made or upon a 
charge not tried constitutes a denial of due process." Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307, 
314 (1979) (citations omitted). 
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995). 
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial 
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the 
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct App. 2008). 
C. Idaho Code § 18-6608 Does Not Criminalize Mr. Elias' Actions 
Idaho appellate Courts freely review issues of statutory interpretation. State v. 
Jones, 154 Idaho 412, 418 (2013) (citing State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851 (2012)). 
When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the literal words used in the statute 
and construes the pertinent provisions of the statute as a whole. Bradbury v. Idaho 
Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 116 (2009). The Court must not interpret a statute in 
such a way as to render any of its terms mere surplusage; rather, the Court must 
construe the statute as a whole. Id. "It is a fundamental law of statutory construction 
that statutes that are in pari materia are to be construed together, to the end that the 
legislative intent will be given effect." State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 689-690 (2004) 
(citing State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 367 cerl. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984)). "Where 
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a statute with respect to one subject contains a certain provision, the omission of such 
provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a 
different intention existed." Id at 690 (citing Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 164 (1979)). 
The power to correct a socially or otherwise unsound statute lied with the legislature, 
not the judiciary. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 
892-893 (2011 ). 
1. Idaho Code § 18-6608 Does Not Criminalize Penetration By A Foreign 
Object Where The Person Whose Genital Or Anal Opening Is Penetrated 
ls Merely Asleep When The Penetration Occurs 
The evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Mr. Elias 
inserted his finger into the alleged victim's vagina while she slept. However, the Idaho 
legislature has omitted this behavior as a means by which a person can commit the 
crime of unlawful penetration by a foreign object. Idaho Code § 18-6608 reads as 
follows: 
Every person who, for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse, causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal 
opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device, against 
the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats of 
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of 
execution, or where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of 
mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent, or where 
the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or 
anesthetic substance, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the state prison for not more than life. 
I.C. § 18-6608. By its plain language, this code section describes a mens rea ("for the 
purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse"), and an actus reas ("causes the 
penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person, by any 
object, instrument or device"). I.C. § 18-6608. In addition, this code section describes 
three means by which the penetration becomes unlawful: 
8 
1) Against the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress, or by threats 
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of 
execution; 
2) Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether 
temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent; or 
3) Where the victim is prevented from resistance by any intoxicating, narcotic or 
anesthetic substance. 
LC. § 18-6608. Notably absent from this code section is any mention of the penetration 
becoming unlawful because the person whose genital or anal opening is penetrated is 
asleep. Id. Under a plain reading of I. C. § 18-6608, penetration by a foreign object is 
not unlawful merely because the penetration occurred while the victim was asleep. 
Applying principles of statutory interpretation beyond simply reading the plain 
language of the statute leads to the same conclusion. Under the doctrine of in pari 
materia5, the absence of language in the penetration by a foreign object statute (I.C. 
§ 18-6608) criminalizing penetration while the victim is sleeping, where such language 
is specifically included in both the rape (I.C. § 18-6101) and the male rape (I.C. 
§ 18-6108) statutes, counsels toward the conclusion that the legislature has purposely 
omitted penetration occurring while the victim is merely asleep from the conduct 
prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608. In contrast to I.C. § 18-6608, both the rape and male rape 
5 The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means 
that each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the 
same matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to 
the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and construed as one 
system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be 
inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by 
one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and harmonious 
in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the 
intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and 
so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382 (1999) (quoting Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm'n, 124 Idaho 1, 4 (1993).) 
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statutes contain explicit provisions describing the crime as occurring where the victim is 
merely asleep. 
Idaho Code§ 18-1601 states in pertinent part, 
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or 
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female 
under any one (1) of the following circumstances: 
(6) Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act. As used 
in this section, "unconscious of the nature of the act" means incapable of 
resisting because the victim meets one (1) of the following conditions: 
(a) Was unconscious or asleep; 
(b) Was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or cognizant that the act 
occurred. 
I.C. § 18-6101(6). Likewise, Idaho Code§ 18-6108 states in pertinent part, 
Male rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral or anal 
opening of another male, with the perpetrator's penis, for the purpose of 
sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(7) Where the victim is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act, 
and this is known to the accused. 
LC.§ 18-6108(7). 
In both of these statutes, perpetration of the crime due to the victim being 
unconscious is listed as a specific means of committing the crime. This means is listed 
separately from and in addition to the use of force or threat of force, unsoundness of 
mind, and intoxication, which are all listed as separate means of committing both rape 
and male rape in their respective statutes. See I.C. §§ 18-6101 (3)-(5) and I.C. 
§§ 18-6108(3)-(6). The omission of language criminalizing penetration by a foreign 
object where the alleged victim is merely asleep demonstrates that the legislature 
specifically omitted the victim's status as being merely asleep (and not intoxicated or of 
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unsound mind) as being a means by which a person can commit the crime of 
penetration by a foreign objection. 
The legislative history further supports this conclusion. Prior to July of 2002, I.C. 
§ 18-6608 prohibited penetration by a foreign object only where it occurred against the 
victim's will by the use of force or threat of force. I.C. § 18-6608 (2001 ). The statute 
was amended, however, in 2002 to add the language found today criminalizing 
penetration by a foreign object where either the victim is incapable of giving consent 
due to being of unsound mind or is prevented from resisting by an intoxicating, narcotic 
or anesthetic substance. Compare I.C. § 18-6608 (2001) with I.C. § 18-6608 (2002); 
see also 2002 Idaho Laws Ch. 360 (S.B. 1354). 
The Statement of Purpose articulating the reason for the 2002 amendment reads 
as follows: 
The purpose of this bill is to close a gap in Idaho's sex crimes code, 
brought to our attention by a victim. It amends 18-6608, the law on 
forcible sexual penetration by use of foreign object, to include victims who 
are incapable of resistance because of unsoundness of mind, narcotics or 
anesthetic substances. 
2002 Idaho Laws Ch. 360 (S.B. 1354) (Statement of Purpose RS 11734). At the time of 
this amendment, both the rape and male rape statutes included provisions criminalizing 
penile penetration where the victim was of unsound mind, or where the victim was 
prevented from resistance through the use of intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic 
substances, in addition to criminalizing the behavior where the victim was asleep or 
unconscious of the nature of the act. See I.C. § 18-6101 (2),(4),(5) (2001 ); I.C. 
§ 18-6108(1),(4),(5) (2001). Thus, the legislature was aware of a "gap in Idaho's sex 
crimes code" and amended I.C. § 18-6608 to include "victims who are incapable of 
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resistance because of unsoundness of mind, narcotic or anesthetic substances," but 
omitted victims who do not consent due to being asleep or unconscious of the act. 
In sum, the Idaho legislature has not criminalized penetration by the use of a 
foreign object where the victim is merely asleep. 
2. Under The Use Of Force Theory, Idaho Code § 18-6608 Requires The 
State To Prove The Defendant Used An Amount Of Force In Excess Of 
The Amount Of Force Necessary To Accomplish The Penetration Itself 
In order to sustain a conviction for violation of I.C. § 18-6608 under the use of 
force theory, the State must prove that the defendant: 1) for the purpose of sexual 
arousal, gratification, or abuse; 2) causes the penetration, however slight, of the genital 
or anal opening of another person, by any object, instrument or device; 3) against the 
victim's will; and 4) by the use of force or violence or by duress; or 4a), by threats of 
immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution. LC. 
§ 18-6608. Under a plain reading of the statute, the State must prove both penetration, 
and the use of force (as well as the other elements); thus, giving effect to every word 
and clause and avoiding interpreting the statute as containing surplusage, I.C. 
§ 18-6608 requires the State to prove that the defendant used some amount of force in 
addition to the amount necessary to accomplish the penetration itself. 
In State v. Jones, 154 Idaho 412 (2013), this Court analyzed what is now Idaho 
Code § 18-6101 (4),6 the statute criminalizing rape occurring by the use of force. Id. 
Idaho Code§ 18-6101(4) reads as follows: 
Rape is defined as the penetration, however slight, of the oral, anal or 
vaginal opening with the perpetrator's penis accomplished with a female 
under any one (1) of the following circumstances: 
6 The statute in question was designated as I.C. § 18-6101 (3) when Mr. Elias was 
charged but has since been renumbered as I.C. § 18-6101 (4). 
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(4) Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by force or violence. 
§ 18-6101(4). The Jones Court set out to determine whether the "intrinsic force" or 
the "extrinsic force" standard applies to the forcible rape statute. The Court described 
"extrinsic force" by the definition adopted by the Washington Court of Appeals in 
State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 538 (Wash. App. 1989), which stated, 
The force to which reference is made in forcible compulsion "is not 
the force inherent in the act of penetration but the force used or 
threatened overcome or prevent resistance by the female." ... 
Where the degree of force exerted by the perpetrator is the distinguishing 
feature between second and third degree rape, to establish second 
degree rape the evidence must be sufficient to show that the force exerted 
was directed at overcoming the victim's resistance and was more than that 
which is normally required to achieve penetration. 
Jones, 154 Idaho at 421 ( citing McKnight 77 4 P .2d at 535 ( emphasis added) ( citations 
omitted)). "The intrinsic force standard, on the other hand, represents the more modern 
trend. It provides that any amount of force-even that which is inherent in 
intercourse-can substantiate a charge of rape." Id. (emphasis added). Ultimately, 
the Jones Court held that, "based upon the plain language of I.C. § 18-6101 [(4)] ... the 
extrinsic force standard applies in Idaho" to the force or violence language used in that 
statue. Id. at 422. 
Although I.C. § 18-6101(4) requires a showing that the victim "resists but her 
resistance is overcome by force or violence;) whereas I.C. § 18-6608 speaks of the 
penetration being "against the victim's will by use of force or violence or by duress," this 
distinction does not render the extrinsic force standard inapplicable to I.C. § 18-6608. 
The Jones Court did not rely upon the fact that the State is required to prove "use of 
force" in addition to "resistance" in concluding that the extrinsic force standard; rather, 
the Court relied upon the fact that the State was required to prove "use of force" in 
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addition to "penetration." Jones 154 Idaho at 421-422. The Court stated, "[w]ere we to 
construe 'force' as encompassing the act of penetration itself, it would effectively render 
the force element moot. Force would always be present and never have to be proven, 
so long as there was sexual intercourse." Id. at 422. 
Relying upon the Jones decision, the Court of Appeals held the use of force 
theory under I.C. § 18-6608 requires a showing of "extrinsic force"; that is, the State 
must demonstrate the defendant used an amount of force beyond that inherent in the 
act of penetration itself. (Opinion, pp.4-11.) The Court recognized, 
In order to uphold a conviction under section 18-6608 with facts such as 
are presented here, this Court must either dispense of the force 
requirement, finding penetration with an object occurring against the will of 
the victim is sufficient to constitute criminal conduct, or add in language 
similar to that found in the rape statutes, but missing from section 
18-6608. It is the province of the Legislature to amend the statute to cover 
the circumstances of this case and not within the power of this Court. 
(Opinion, p.11.) Mr. Elias asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted 
I.C. § 18-6608. 
The State articulates no cogent reason for this Court to find that a violation of 
I.C. § 18-6608 can occur due solely to the fact that the victim did not consent to the 
penetration. Relying upon a footnote in the Court of Appeals' decision, the State argues 
that "[t]he Court of Appeals' interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-6608 . . . directly 
contradicts the plain meaning of the statute's language and is clearly incompatible with 
its legislative intent. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.6-7 (citing 
Opinion, pp.7-8, fn.5.) In the footnote in question, the Court of Appeals notes a 
"foreseeable problem" with the statute because the amount of force used to cause 
penetration will vary with the size of the object used. (Opinion, pp.7-8, fn.5.) However, 
the Court correctly noted that it is for the legislature to fix this perceived problem. Id. 
14 
Although the State makes the assertion that the Court of Appeals interpreted the 
statute in contradiction to its plain meaning and legislative intent, the State provides no 
actual analysis of the literal words contained in the statute, and provides no actual 
legislative history supporting its conclusory statement. (See generally Respondent's 
Brief in Support of Petition for Review.) Rather, the State merely provides a colorful 
hypothetical involving a baseball bat and argues, "some acts, by their very nature, are 
inherently forceful, violent, and threatening to an outrageous degree."7 (Respondent's 
Brief in Support of Petition for Review, p.7.) Regardless of the degree of outrage a 
particular act compels, it is for the legislature, not this Court, to pass legislation that 
criminalizes behavior that is "inherently forceful, violent, and threatening to an 
outrageous degree." See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 
889, 892-893 (2011 ). The State's argument has no merit. 
The State further claims that the Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine of in 
pari materia,8 arguing that there is a distinction between the "force" elements in 
I.C. § 18-6101 and I.C. § 18-6608. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, pp.7-8.) The State reasons that under I.C. § 18-6101(4), the State is required 
7 In reality, the same concern expressed by the Court of Appeals and relied upon by the 
State for its specious argument, is present in both I.C. § 18-6101 (4) and I.C. 
§ 18-6108(4). As a matter of biology, physics, and common sense, the amount of force 
necessary to accomplish penile penetration is dependent upon the size and state of the 
penis in question, relative to the size and state of the orifice in question, at the time of 
the penetration. This indisputable reality does not demonstrate that this Court's 
recognition in Jones that the extrinsic force standard applies to I.C. § 18-6101(4) (and 
presumably I.C. § 18-6108(4)), is in contradiction of the plain meaning of these statutes 
and is incompatible with legislative intent. 
8 Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the Court of Appeals applied the 
doctrine of in pari materia to its determination that I. C. § 18-6608 does not criminalize 
penetration by a foreign object where the alleged victim is merely asleep, rather than to 
the use of the terms "force" in each statute. (Opinion, pp.4-8.) 
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to prove that the defendant used "force" in order to overcome the victim's resistance 
and, therefore, "the extrinsic force standard is appropriate." (Respondent's Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review, p.8.) However, the State asserts, "under the forcible 
sexual penetration statute, the state must show only that the assailant caused the 
penetration by the use of force or violence; consent is a separate element." 
(Respondent's Brief, p.8.) Therefore, the State concludes that forcible sexual 
penetration is merely a "specialized battery" which occurs whenever there is 
nonconsensual penetration of the anus or vagina. (Respondent's Brief in Support or 
Petition for Review, pp.8-9.) 
Again, the State's argument ignores the plain language of I.C. § 18-6608, and 
misconstrues this Court's holding in Jones. By its plain language, the State must prove 
that the defendant "for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse cause[d] the 
penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person, by any 
object, instrument or device, against the victim's will by use of force ... " I.C. § 18-6608. 
The State must prove both penetration and that the penetration occurred "against the 
victim's will by the use of force." The Jones Court recognized that if it were to construe 
the "force" requirement as being proven merely due to the fact that penetration 
occurred, the force element would be rendered moot as it would always be present. 
Jones 154 Idaho at 422. The same problem plagues the State's argument in this case. 
If this Court were to construe I.C. § 18-6608 as a "specialized battery" where in the 
force element is necessarily proven by proof of penetration, the force element would be 
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rendered moot 9 Such an interpretation is counter to principles of statutory construction 
requiring this Court to interpret a statute consistently with the literal meaning of the 
words contained therein, and to not interpret a statute in such as way as to render 
included words as mere surplusage. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107, 
116 (2009). 
This Court should hold that, I.C. § 18-6608 requires the State to prove the 
defendant used force in excess of that necessary to accomplish the act of penetration in 
order to sustain a conviction under the use of force theory. 
3. Under The Unsoundness Of Mind Theory, The State Cannot Sustain A 
Conviction Under I.C. § 18-6608 Merely By Demonstrating That The 
Victim Is Asleep 
The State has not argued that, under I.C. § 18-6608, it can demonstrate that an 
alleged victim was of unsound mind due to the fact that they were unconscious or 
asleep at the time of the penetration. (See Respondent's Brief; Respondent's Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review.) Idaho Code § 18-6608 cannot be interpreted as 
allowing for a conviction under such a theory. 
As the Court of Appeals held, 
This Court has previously interpreted the meaning of "unsoundness of 
mind" in the context of the rape statute. See State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 691, 
52 P.3d 335 (Ct.App.2002). In Doe, we applied the rule of statutory 
construction and concluded that "unsoundness of mind," as used in the 
rape statute, refers to "mental disability caused by mental illness, 
retardation or other abnormality." Id. at 693, 52 P.3d at 337. We relied on 
the plain meaning of the term "unsound" as not physically healthy or whole 
or having disease, abnormality, or defect such that usefulness is impaired. 
9 In addition to being completely inconsistent with principles of statutory construction, 
the State's "specialized battery" theory completely disregards the fact that the State 
must prove the defendant acted "for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or 
abuse," a purpose not required to be proven where a battery is charged. See 
I.C. § 18-6608; I.C. § 18-903. 
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Id. Under any interpretation of the term, we cannot find that being asleep 
fits within the plain meaning of "unsoundness of mind." As there is no 
other evidence showing a mental disability or abnormality on the part of 
the victim in this case, the evidence is insufficient to uphold the conviction 
under the second theory alleged by the State. 
(Opinion, pp.11-12.) Mr. Elias asserts that this Court should adopt the Court of Appeals' 
rationale and hold that, when read in pari materia, the legislature's use of the phrase, 
"Where the victim is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, whether temporary 
or permanent, of giving legal consent," found in I.C. § 18-6608, has the same meaning 
as the phrase, "Where she is incapable, through any unsoundness of mind, due to any 
cause including, but not limited to, mental illness, mental disability or developmental 
disability, whether temporary or permanent, of giving legal consent," found in 
I.C. § 18-6101(3). Both phrases refer to the victim's lack of consent being due to a 
mental illness, not to being asleep. Therefore, the State cannot sustain a conviction for 
a violation of I. C. § 18-6608 under an unsoundness of mind theory merely by showing 
that the victim is asleep. 
D. The State Presented No Evidence To Support A Finding That Mr. Elias 
Committed A Crime Prohibited By Idaho Code § 18-6608 
The State presented no evidence that Mr. Elias penetrated Ms. Steciuk's vagina 
in a manner prohibited by I.C. § 18-6608. Ms. Steciuk described the event as follows: 
A. I woke up with Jesse sitting on the end of my bed, and he had his 
fingers inside of my vagina. 
Q. About what time was this? 
A. Um, about 3:30. 
Q. In the morning? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This would be on July 20th then? 
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A. Yes. 
What was - what was it that woke you up at 3:30 a.m.? 
A. Somebody touching me. 
Q What do you mean? 
A. Like not normally, you know, like I would roll over and my kids 
would touch me, you know, that kind of stuff didn't wake me up, but he -
having his fingers inside of me. 
Q And when you woke up was there any pain associated with that? 
A. Yes. When I first felt it, I rolled over onto my right side, and I felt it 
kind of like a razor cut kind of burn feeling from, and that's what really 
woke me up. 
Q. This razor cut burning feeling, where did you feel it from? 
A. Inside my vagina. 
Q. And after you - did you roll onto your side or - well, first of all, how 
were you positioned? 
A. I was laying on my back, and I had rolled over onto my right side. 
Q. And how were you dressed? 
A. I had a big T-shirt on. 
Q. Is that what you would customarily wear then is a nightgown? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. is that it? Is that all you had on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you woke up and his hands were where you described - his 
hand was where you described where it was, um, where did you roll to? 
A. Onto my right side. 
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Q. And when you did that what happened to the hand that was inside 
your vagina? 
A It moved when I rolled over, and then I felt it again after I rolled 
over. 
Q. Describe the second time that you felt it. 
A It didn't go in, but I felt him touching me still. 
Q. Where did you feel him touching you the second time? 
A Um, on my - on my - like my butt right before, you know, my 
vagina. 
Q. What side did you feel it touching? Was it the right side or your left 
side? 
A It was on the back side. 
Q. And when this happened how was Mr. Elias positioned on the bed, 
do you recall? 
A Yeah. He was sitting on the end of my bed to the left of me, kind of 
sitting sideways with his right arm by me. 
Q. And were your kids in the same location on either side of you? 
A. Yes. I had my - I believe my daughter was on my left side, and my 
son was on my right side. 
Q. Were they still asleep? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. What did you do after you felt him touch you a second time? 
A. Rolled over again onto my left side to cover myself completely with 
my blanket. 
Q. What do you mean cover yourself with your blanket? 
A. Like wrap myself up like a hot dog kind of in my blanket so that way 
he couldn't get in there again. 
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Q. What happened after you rolled the - after the second time you felt 
him touch you? 
A He asked me if I knew who he was. 
Q. Describe how he went about asking you that 
A. He just said, "Do you know who I am? Do you know who I am?" 
Q. How many times did he say that, "Do you know who I am?" 
A About three. 
Q. And when he was saying this were you able to see his face at all? 
A. Um, it was pretty dark in my room. My T.V. was on, but I could see 
like the outline of him, and I think about the third time that he asked me 
was when I realized who he was just because of his voice. 
Q. About how far away was he from you when he was doing this 
touching of you? 
A. He was sitting right at my feet, like right to the left of my feet. 
Q. Did he attempt to touch you a third time? 
A. Yes he did. 
Q. Can you tell us about that, please? 
A. He didn't make it under the blanket. I was wrapped. 
Q. Where did you feel his hand this time? 
A. I felt it under the blanket like under my leg, but he couldn't get 
through the blanket. 
Q. What happened after the third time that he attempted to touch you? 
A. That was when he asked me for the third time if I knew who he 
was, and I said, "Yes, Jesse, I do," and he said, "Do you want me to 
leave," and I said, "Yes, I do," and he got up and he walked into my 
bathroom which was right next to my bedroom - well, that's where I think 
he went. I didn't get up and follow him, but it sounded like he went into the 
bathroom, and that's when I called my friend who I had been staying with 
prior because I didn't want to - I didn't know what to do. I didn't want to 
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panic and call the cops, I didn't know what was gonna happen, so I called 
my friend, and then he stayed on the phone with me while I called 
dispatch. 
(Tr. Trial, p.40, L.23 - p.45, L.11.) Ms. Steciuk testified to no other acts of penetration 
and there was no evidence presented that she was either of unsound mind or suffering 
the effects of any substances. (Tr. Trial, p.45, L.12 - p.68, L.6.) 
Furthermore, the State failed to present any evidence that Mr. Elias used any 
force in addition to the amount of force necessary to accomplish the act of penetration. 
No evidence was presented that he used his body weight to hold Ms. Steciuk in order to 
accomplish the act of penetration (see Jones, 154 Idaho at 422) or even that he 
positioned her body or removed any clothing to accomplish the act of penetration. The 
only evidence presented by the State was that Mr. Elias, in fact, digitally penetrated 
Ms. Steciuk. 
The State relies upon the fact that Ms. Steciuk felt pain and there was an injury 
associated with the penetration to argue that the jury could conclude that the evidence 
supports a finding that Mr. Elias used more force than was necessary to accomplish the 
act penetration. (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.9-10.) The 
State provides this Court with a dictionary definition of the word "inherent" and argues 
that "because sexual penetration can be caused without pain or injury, pain and injury 
are not inherent in sexual penetration." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, p.1 O (emphasis in the original).) Thus, the State asserts, "a jury could 
reasonably infer that the force [Mr.] Elias uses was more that the force necessary to 
merely cause the digital penetration." (Respondent's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, p.10.) The State's argument is logically challenged. 
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The word "inherent" as used by the Jones Court, modifies the term "force" as 
in I.C. § 18-6101(4). i.e., inherent force refers to the amount of force needed to 
accomplish the act of penetration itself. See Jones, 154 Idaho at 421-422. In other 
words, the term "inherent force" applies to the cause of the penetration. The State, 
however, erroneously applies the term "inherent" to the effect of the penetration noting 
that "pain and injury are not inherent in sexual penetration." (Respondent's Brief in 
Support of Petition for Review, p.10.) The fact that Ms. Steciuk suffered an injury and 
felt the pain associated with that injury supports a conclusion that her vagina was 
digitally penetrated, not that Mr. Elias used an amount force in excess of the amount of 
force necessary to accomplish the act of penetration itself. This Court should reject the 
State's analysis. 
The State failed to present any evidence during the trial, and does not cite to any 
evidence in this appeal, that would lead the jury to conclude that the fact of pain and 
injury was anything other than incidental to the penetration itself. The State presented 
the testimony of Dr. Amon, who examined Ms. Steciuk and discovered the injury, and 
who opined that a finger or other object could cause the injury. (Tr. Trial, p.95, L.20 -
p.106, L.10.) The State presented no testimony from Dr. Amon or anyone else as to the 
amount of force necessary to cause the injury, let alone whether that amount of force 
would have to be in excess of the amount of force necessary to cause the penetration 
itself. (See generally, Tr. Trial.) The fact that there was pain and injury does not 
support a conclusion that Mr. Elias used more force than necessary to accomplish the 
act of penetration. Pain and injury can be incidental to consensual penetration where 
no extrinsic force is used, just as pain and injury may be absent from non-consensual 
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penetration where no extrinsic force is used. The injury and associated pain suffered by 
Ms. Steciuk is not sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. Elias uses more force than was 
necessary to commit the act of penetration; thus, the State failed to present sufficfent 
evidence to support the conviction. 
There is, without question, a problem with Idaho Code§ 18-6608, in that it does 
not criminalize the behavior that the jury found Mr. Elias had engaged in. Nevertheless, 
this Court does not have the power to re-write § 18-6608 to criminalize Mr. Elias' 
conduct no matter how abhorrent it may be. See Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-893 (2011) (noting that the power to correct a 
socially or otherwise unsound statute lies with the legislature, and not the judiciary). 
Neither the executive branch nor this Court has the power to make morally 
reprehensible conduct criminal. This Court should reject the State's argument and find 
that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support Mr. Elias' conviction in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Elias respectfully requests that this Court vacate his penetration by a foreign 
object conviction and the resulting sentence imposed. 
DATED this 2ih day of November, 2013. 
JASON C. Pl 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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